Bridging political rifts in India’s neighbourhood

It has been a highly productive time in the India-United States (US) corridor. This newspaper has extensively reported on the tangible progress in the bilateral partnership between Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden. But recent weeks have also thrown up two difficult political issues that reflect a clash between American democracy and foreign policy orientation on one hand, and India’s core security concerns and political sensitivities on the other.
The first is Bangladesh.
There is a political and institutional consensus in India that views the regime change in Dhaka as a deeply negative outcome. The fact that Muhammad Yunus was the star at the United Nations in New York is seen as proof of western involvement in bringing him to power. Indian politicians, diplomats and spies may concede that Sheikh Hasina didn’t play her cards right. But they are convinced that the street protests were a product of the political support of western States, liberal civil society funding and Islamist power. The interim government is seen as lacking legitimacy, Yunus as a prop, his lot as a bunch of jholawallahs, student leaders as mostly Islamists, the Americans as either devious or naive or both, the regime as anti-Hindu, and the Bangladeshi polity as fragile that will either result in deep instability or pave the way for a more Islamist regime. India, the Delhi consensus holds, will be left handling the security implications of the mess in the Northeast.
Americans view the regime change as positive and as a direct consequence of internal factors, primarily Hasina’s outright repression. The US was sympathetic to protests, and had conveyed to the security forces that killing students was a red line, but Americans adamantly reject the premise that they orchestrated the change. Western diplomats recognise both the fragility and fragmented nature of Dhaka’s polity. It is fragile because Bangladesh has a government with political legitimacy but no electoral legitimacy; it is fragmented because there are multiple power centres, from the army to students to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to Jamaat. But the US system sees hope in Yunus and the democratic potential of this moment; it is supportive of the reformist agenda of the interim government and eventually wants elections. Delhi, in this view, should stop playing spoiler and introspect about how its flawed policy of supporting one person and belligerent Hindutva at home has alienated the Bangladeshi street.
There is clearly a serious gulf in perceptions between India and the US, with direct implications for trust because it hits at the core of Indian security interests in its east and political sensitivities in the heartland. And the only way out is not a blame game about the past, but even deeper engagement between India and the US on one track, and Delhi and Bangladeshi political actors, including erstwhile hostile forces, on the other.
This multi-track dialogue needs to have a strong forward-looking thrust, including the nature of the interim government’s reform agenda, the sequence and timeline of reforms and elections, the role of external actors in the process, the redlines on extremism, and the responsibility of Dhaka on Indian security sensitivities. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen because Bangladeshi actors are too divided in general but unified only in their anger with India; India is mistrustful of Bangladeshi forces in varying degrees, doesn’t believe in the current process, and is angry with the US, and the US is exasperated with India. But, if Bangladesh’s political transition isn’t sequenced and managed well, there is no external ownership with an Indian role, and the interim government fails, the political landscape will only get more adverse for all actors.
The second issue is Khalistan.
American policymakers just don’t get how deeply the Punjab insurgency scarred the Indian State and traumatised Indian society, costing the nation a PM, Army generals, politicians and tens of thousands of people. Being seen as remotely complicit in legitimising a secessionist movement that thrives on anti-Hindu hate and is backed by Pakistani intelligence is a recipe to earn Indian distrust. Nuanced US explanations about separation of powers that result in court summons, the need for the executive branch to engage with all voices, or the higher threshold for speech due to the first amendment, are greeted with scepticism. The worst is assumed, with many in India left wondering whether the US is using the issue as leverage, though to what end is unclear.
For its part, India sometimes doesn’t fully grasp the openness of western democracies. It doesn’t review how its own actions, including involvement in possible assassination plots, have made unknown terrorists poster boys. It often fails to distinguish between those who are critical of the Indian State on social media, those who are actively hostile to India in political mobilisation, and those who have become violent secessionists.
The reasons for the varying degrees of alienation span from a sense of deep hurt about 1984 to being influenced by false propaganda about the lack of Sikh religious freedom in today’s Punjab, from a degree of backlash against what minorities see as a violation of Indian secular compact to incentives aligned with migration and networks of organised crime. Engaging with the community through credible, moderate political interlocutors has become imperative.
But at the bilateral India-US level, this gulf in perceptions once again points to the urgency of a political dialogue. A common ground rests on first principles: The US has to take action against anyone engaged in violence or the planning of violence in India; the US must share intelligence on Khalistani activities in good faith; Indian agencies must professionally push forth their case on individual terrorists; India must never again entertain the prospect of acting on its own on American soil and institute some degree of accountability.
The India-US partnership is deep, broad, and strong. But treating political wounds early will ensure that it remains healthy and forces that wish to deepen mistrust between Delhi and DC are defeated.
The views expressed are personal